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The California Evidence Code:
A Precis
By JoHN R. McDoNouGH*
THE 1965 Session of the California Legislature enacted a new
California Evidence Code, which will go into effect on January 1,
1967.1 The Evidence Code was drafted and proposed by the California
Law Revision Commission,2 with the cooperation and able assistance
of a large number of individuals and of a variety of organizations,
including the State Bar, the Judicial Council, the Conference of
California Judges, and many others.3 As a general framework for the
articles and notes which follow, and which will deal with particular
matters in considerable depth and detail, this article will attempt to
provide a relatively brief general description of the new Evidence
Code, with particular emphasis on those provisions which either
change or may change the California law of evidence.
The Law Revision Commission's aim in undertaking the Evi-
dence Code project was to produce a handbook of the California
law of evidence, containing both a comprehensive code of evidence
and draftsmen's comments designed to assist judges and lawyers in
understanding and applying its provisions.4 It should be made clear
* LL.B. 1946, Columbia University. Professor of Law, Stanford University. Member,
California Law Revision Commission. The writer is indebted to John H. DeMoully,
Executive Secretary of the California Law Revision Commission, and Joseph B.
Harvey, Assistant Executive Secretary of the California Law Revision Commission, for
their assistance in preparing parts of this article, but acknowledges that any deficiences
are, however, entirely his own.
' Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299. Additions to the Evidence Code, not recommended by
the Law Revision Commission, were made by Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 937 and ch. 1152.
27 CAL. LAw REvisioN Com'N, REPoRTs, REcomnDmpATIONS & STUDIES (1965)
[hereinafter cited as CAL. L. RmsioN Co M'N]. The Commission's tentative recom-
mendations and the several research studies relating to the Evidence Code are found
in 6 CAL. L. RvsmIoN ConD'ZN (1964).
3 A list of many of the persons who participated in the effort is found in 7 CAL.
L. REvisION COMn'N 5 (1965).
4 In proposing the Evidence Code, the California Law Revision Commission pro-
vided a comment for each code section. The comment explained the section's purpose
as well as its relation to other sections of the code and discussed some potential prob-
lems of its meaning or application. Similar comments were provided for each section
added, amended, or repealed in other California codes when the Evidence Code was
enacted.
These comments are of special significance in the legislative history of the Evidence
Code as a result of the special attention given them by the legislative committees that
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at the outset that although it does make a number of changes in the
law, the new Evidence Code is far more a restatement of existing
law than it is a revision of the California law of evidence. This fact
should not be obscured by the emphasis in the rest of this issue on
the departures from prior law which are made by the Code.
The Evidence Code is divided into eleven divisions. The first two
of these, entitled "Preliminary Provisions and Construction" and
"Words and Phrases Defined," are formal and definitional and need
not be discussed. They should not, however, be overlooked in using
the Evidence Code.
Division 3-General Provisions
The Basic Structure of the Evidence Code
Although the Evidence Code consists of roughly 400 sections,
two sections contained in division 3 are of paramount importance to
an understanding of the Code's structure and its impact on preexisting
law. The first of these is section 300 which defines the Code's area
of application:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, this code applies in every
action before the Supreme Court or a district court of appeal, superior
court, municipal court, or justice court, including proceedings in such
actions conducted by a referee, court commissioner, or similar officer,
but does not apply in grand jury proceedings.
This provision means that the Evidence Code applies to all court
proceedings, but only to court proceedings, "except as otherwise
provided by statute." A major exception "otherwise provided by
statute" appears in the Evidence Code itself, in that division 8, entitled
"Privileges," is made applicable to all proceedings by section 910:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the provisions of this divi-
sion apply in all proceedings. The provisions of any statute making
rules of evidence inapplicable in particular proceedings, or limiting
considered the code. Both the Assembly and the Senate Committees on Judiciary issued
special reports on Assembly bill 333 (1965), which became the California Evidence
Code, in which the Law Revision Commission's comments were declared to express
the respective committee's intent in approving the bill, except to the extent that new
or revised comments were set out by the committees themselves. See JounNALOF THE
AssMEmLY, April 6, 1965, and JounNAL OF =HE SENATE, April 21, 1965.
Therefore, for each section of the Evidence Code and for each section of other
codes that was revised or enacted by Assembly bill 333 there is a comment which is
either a legislative committee comment that was set forth in one of the two legislative
committee reports, or a Law Revision Commission comment, that was approved by
the legislative committees, but not set out in their reports.
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the applicability of rules of evidence in particular proceedings, do
not make this division inapplicable to such proceedings.5
Except for division 8, however, the Evidence Code does not apply to
legislative hearings, administrative proceedings, arbitration proceed-
ings or other non-court proceedings unless some statute so provides or
the particular tribunal involved, having the power to do so, chooses
voluntarily to apply the Code, or parts of it. It should also be noted
that a statute may specifically make the Evidence Code inapplicable,
wholly or in part, to some kinds of court proceedings.(
The other section which is central to the format and essential to
an understanding of the Evidence Code is section 351: "Except as
otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible."
The effect of section 351, speaking generally, is to wipe the slate
clean insofar as the pre-1967 California law of evidence is concerned.
This section makes all matter having probative value prima facie
admissible in court proceedings, but, again, this is "except as otherwise
provided by statute." Of course, a good deal of the Evidence Code
consists of just such statutes-that is, of exclusionary rules of evidence,
which limit the scope of section 351. For example, division 8, entitled
"Privileges" enacts some eleven testimonial privileges which bar
certain relevant evidence on the theory that more important societal
ends are served by protecting confidentiality under the various circum-
stances involved. Similarly, division 10, entitled "Hearsay Evidence"
begins with section 1200, the hearsay rule, which operates to bar all
relevant hearsay evidence that does not fall into one of the several
hearsay exceptions which are found in the Code and elsewhere. Other
exclusionary rules are found in division 9, entitled "Evidence Affected
or Excluded by Extrinsic Policies." Still other exceptions to section
351 "provided by statute" are found in sections of various California
codes other than the Evidence Code. Nevertheless, the starting point
5
"Proceeding" is defined in CAL. EVwENCE CODE § 901 to mean "any action,
hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted by a court, administrative
agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other person authorized by
law) in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given."
6 See, e.g., CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 117(g) (judge of small claims court may make
informal investigation either in or out of court), CA.. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 1768 (hearing
of conciliation proceeding to be conducted informally), CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 2016(b)
(inadmissibility of testimony at trial is not ground for objection to testimony sought
from a deponent, provided that such testimony is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence), CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203 (judge must consider proba-
tion officer's investigative report on question of probation), CAL. W=rmE & INsT'Ns
CODE § 706 (juvenile court must consider probation officer's social study in determin-
ing disposition to be made of ward or dependent child).
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in understanding the structure of the Evidence Code-and the Cali-
fornia law of evidence after January 1, 1967-is section 351, which
enacts the basic proposition that all relevant evidence is admissible.
All else in the Evidence Code relates to and revolves around this
basic provision.
It should be particularly noted that the only exceptions to the
admission of evidence are those provided by statute.7 "Statute" is
defined in section 230 to include treaties and constitutional provisions,
but not decisional law.8 Thus, there will be no decisional rules exclud-
ing relevant evidence in this State after January 1, 1967. Nor will
there be any such rules in the future unless and until section 351 is
amended or repealed. There will, of course, continue to be judicial
decisions interpreting statutes, treaties, and constitutional provisions
which themselves exclude relevant evidence, and recent experience
suggests that this judicial power of interpretation, as it is currently
being exercised by our federal and state courts, is a not insignificant
factor in the development of the law of evidence.
By way of important contrast, it should be noted that there are
several provisions in the Evidence Code which leave it open to the
courts to promulgate decisional rules of law which will make more
kinds of evidence admissible by limiting the effect of various of the
exclusionary rules. For example, section 1200 states that hearsay
evidence is inadmissible "except as provided by law," which, as defined
in section 160, includes decisional law. This language was designedly
chosen to enable the courts to create new exceptions to the hearsay
rule in addition to those set forth in chapter 2 of Division 10 and the
other California codes. On the other hand, the courts cannot create
new privileges by judicial decision because all exclusionary rules are
required by section 351 to be statutory.9
Another Evidence Code exception "provided by statute" to the
broad rule of admissibility stated in section 351 is found in section 352:
The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admis-
sion will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.
7 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 351. (Emphasis added.)
8 Where the Evidence Code refers to decisional law as well as statutes, it uses the
term 'law" which is defined in § 160 to include constitutional, statutory and decisional
law.
9 A similar provision is found in CAL. EViDENCE CoDE § 911, which states specifically
that there are no testimonial privileges "except as otherwise provided by statute ...
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This provision, of course, codifies and continues a power which trial
judges have always had.
Procedure in Admitting and Excluding Evidence
Division 3 of the Evidence Code also contains a number of general
provisions governing the admission or exclusion of evidence. These
provisions define the respective functions of judge and jury,10 establish
the judge's authority to regulate the order of proof," and state the
consequences of an erroneous admission 12 or exclusion 3 of evidence.
Sections 400-06 set forth the procedure that the judge is to follow
in determining the admissibility of evidence when admissibility turns
on a disputed question of fact. In conformance wth prior law,' 4 the
Evidence Code distinguishes between (1) those situations in which
the judge himself determines the existence of the preliminary fact
before the proffered evidence is admitted, and (2) those situations
in which only prima facie proof of the preliminary fact is necessary
to require admission of the proffered evidence and the existence of
the preliminary fact is subject to redetermination by the jury. Under
the Evidence Code the second category includes only the following
situations: (1) where the relevance of the evidence depends upon
the existence of the preliminary fact (e.g., agency or conspiracy),
(2) where the preliminary fact is whether a witness has personal
knowledge concerning a matter, (3) where the preliminary fact is
whether a writing is authentic, and (4) where the preliminary fact
is whether a statement or conduct was that of a particular person.
Additionally, in each of these situations except the second (the
personal knowledge of a witness) the Evidence Code permits the
court, as formerly, 15 to admit the proffered evidence conditionally;
evidence of the preliminary fact is not necessary at the time, but it
must be supplied later in the course of the trial. And in each of these
10 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§ 310-12.
11 CAL. EvmENE CODE § 320.
12 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 353.
'3 CAL. EVmENE CODE § 354.
14 At various points herein it is stated that certain provisions of the Evidence
Code restate existing law. The degree of confidence with which that statement can be
made varies from case to case. This is because the existing rule of law is a good deal
more certain in some cases than in others. One of the principal, and perhaps greatest,
contributions of the Evidence Code is the degree to which it eliminates ambiguity and
uncertainty in the California law of evidence and thus provides California judges and
lawyers with ready answers to most evidentiary problems.
15 CAL. CODE CiV. Faoc. § 1834, Brea v. McGlashan, 3 Cal. App. 2d 454, 465, 39
P.2d 877, 882 (1934).
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situations, the Evidence Code provides, as did prior law,-6 that the
court may, and on request shall, instruct the jury to disregard the
proffered evidence unless the jury finds that the preliminary fact
exists.
Except in the four situations just mentioned, the judge must be
persuaded of the existence of a disputed preliminary fact before he
may admit the proffered evidence. Thus, for example, he must be
persuaded that an expert witness is properly qualified before he may
admit his testimony; and that the person who made a statement
offered as a dying declaration actually thought that he was dying
when he made the statement.' 7 Of course, he must receive the evidence
offered by both sides relating to the existence or nonexistence of the
preliminary fact before he makes his factual determination and his
ruling.
While the Evidence Code largely restates the law on these matters,
it does make a significant change concerning the procedure for admit-
ting confessions and admissions. Under the old law the court had
discretion to hear and determine the admissibility of a confession
or admission of a criminal defendant in the presence and hearing of
the jury.18 This is objectionable because if the judge does so and then
decides to exclude such evidence, the defendant will be prejudiced
if the jury is unable to disregard the references made in argument to
the damaging confession or admission. To avoid this situation, section
402 of the Evidence Code requires such a hearing to be held out of
the presence and hearing of the jury, at the request of either party.
The Evidence Code also abrogates the so-called "second cracek"
doctrine which has applied to confessions, 9 dying declarations,"0 and
spontaneous statements.2 ' Under this doctrine the judge, even though
he has determined that proffered evidence of any of these types is
admissible, must nevertheless submit the issue of the admissibility
of the evidence to the jury, with an instruction to disregard the evidence
if they determine that the particular requirements of admissibility
16E.g., People v. Geiger, 49 Cal. 643, 649 (1875); People v. Talbott, 65 Cal.
App. 2d 654, 663, 151 P.2d 317, 322 (1944).
'7 On the other band, it might be necessary for the judge to determine a preliminary
fact before he may exclude evidence, i.e. he must be persuaded that a lawyer-client
relationship existed before he may exclude evidence based on this privilege.
18People v. Gonzales, 24 Cal. 2d 870, 151 P.2d 251 (1944); People v. Garrow,
237 Cal. App. 2d 439, 442, 47 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (1965).
19 People v. Bevins, 54 Cal. 2d 71, 77, 4 Cal. Rptr. 504, 508, 351 P.2d 776, 780
(1960); People v. Baldwin, 42 Cal. 2d 858, 866-67, 270 P.2d 1028, 1033-34 (1954).2oPeople v. Singh, 182 Cal. 457, 476, 188 Pac. 987, 995 (1920).
21 People v. Keelin, 136 Cal. App. 2d 860, 871, 289 P.2d 520, 527 (1955).
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were not met. The elimination of this "second crack" makes the judge's
ruling final, thereby removing the judge's temptation to "pass the
buck" to the jury by letting the evidence in when a difficult issue of
admissibility arises. Of course, a party may still attack the credibility
of a confession, dying declaration, or spontaneous statement basing
his argument to the jury, wholly or in part, on the same factors as
are weighed by the judge in determining the admissibility of the
evidence.
Division 4-Judicial Notice
Division 4 of the Evidence Code makes several significant changes
in the California law relating to judicial notice. There are relatively
few changes with respect to what matters may be judicially noticed.
There are a number of changes, however, insofar as the mechanics
of taking judicial notice are concerned. These procedural innovations
are primarily designed to guarantee that the parties will have adequate
notice and an opportunity to be heard before judicial notice is taken.
Inasmuch as division 4 is discussed elsewhere in this symposium,
further analysis will not be attempted here.12
Division 5-Burden of Proof, Burden of Producing
Evidence, Presumptions and Inferences
It is helpful to an understanding of this division to begin with the
definition of evidence that appears in section 140 of the Evidence
Code:
"Evidence" means testimony, writings, material objects, or other things
presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or non-
existence of a fact.
This definition does not include inferences or presumptions. Thus,
the rules relating to the process of offering exhibits and testimony to the
trier of fact are clearly distinguished from those relating to the
reasoning process which the jury and judge must perform after the
exhibits and testimony have been admitted. By making this distinction,
it was possible not only to draft more precise statutes dealing with
the process of presenting evidence, such as the hearsay rule, the
best evidence rule, the opinion rule, and the rules on privilege, but
22 For an analysis of the Evidence Code sections dealing with judicial notice,
which appears as part of this symposium on the law of evidence, see Kongsgaard,
Judicial Notice and the California Evidence Code, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 117 (1966)-
Editor.
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also to draft more precise statutes dealing with the process of reason-
ing from the evidence.
In making it clear that presumptions are not evidence, the Evi-
dence Code departs significantly from the California Law it super-
sedes. Under the Code presumptions are rules of law which guide
the trier of fact in reasoning from evidence. This is a desirable change
in California law which will bring it, finally, into harmony with the
law prevailing in most other American jurisdictions.
Division 5 contains the Evidence Code rules that govern the
process of reasoning from evidence to determine the ultimate facts.
Thus, it contains provisions relating to the burden of proof, the burden
of producing evidence, presumptions, and inferences. Except as noted,
the rules stated generally reflect the prior law.
Burden of Proof
The burden of proof is defined in section 115 of the Evidence
Code as the obligation of presenting sufficient evidence to establish
a particular degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact concerning
a disputed fact. Usually, the evidence need only cause the trier of
fact to believe that it is more likely than not that the fact involved
is as claimed by the party having the burden of proof. However, the
Code recognizes that a greater or a lesser degree of belief may
sometimes be required. For example, the prosecution's burden in a
criminal case is to cause the trier of fact to believe the several elements
of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, a lesser
degree of belief may sometimes suffice, as in the recent case of In re
Corey. 3 There, Justice Molinari pointed out that a defendant in
a criminal case has the burden of proving his alibi only to such a
degree as will leave a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of
fact as to the defendant's guilt of the crime with which he is charged.
If the defendant succeeds in creating such a doubt, the trier of fact
is required to find for the defendant. Because the defendant's burden
in such a case is that of creating a state of belief in the mind of the
trier of fact, his burden is a true burden of proof as that term is used
in the Evidence Code.
Thus, the rules relating to burden of proof tell the trier of fact
who should prevail on a particular issue in light of the evidence
produced. If the party with the burden of proof succeeds in creating
the requisite degree of belief by his evidence, the trier of fact is
required to find in his favor on that issue; but if he fails to create the
23230 Cal. App. 2d 813, 828, 41 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (1964).
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requisite degree of belief, the trier of fact is required to find against
him. These rules represent no change in the law.
The Evidence Code recognizes that there is no simple, mechanical
formula for determining where the burden of proof lies.24 The burden
of proof is implicitly placed on a party either by the Legislature or
by the courts when they determine, as a matter of substantive law,
what facts must be established to make out a claim for judicial relief
and what facts, if established, constitute a defense. The Evidence
Code makes no change in these allocations of the burden of proof on
matters of substantive law. It does, however, contain a number of
provisions allocating the burden of proof on facts necessary to show
the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence.25
Burden of Producing Evidence
The burden of producing evidence is defined in section 110 of the
Evidence Code as a party's obligation to introduce sufficient evidence
to avoid a ruling against him on an issue as a matter of law. Under
Evidence Code section 550 this burden always rests initially on the
party with the burden of proof, but may subsequently shift. What
the burden of producing evidence amounts to is that if the party hav-
ing the burden of proof as to an ultimate fact produces no evidence
from which the trier of fact could find the fact, the judge must rule
against him: dismiss the case, grant a nonsuit, direct a verdict, grant
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or refuse to submit an affima-
tive defense to the jury. The burden of producing evidence respecting
an issue will shift to the other party if and when the party who first
had that burden has introduced evidence so compelling that the judge
would be required to rule in his favor as a matter of law in the ab-
sence of contrary evidence-a comparatively rare situation, of course,
but one that can and does occur.
The Evidence Code thus clarifies the distinction between the two
evidentiary burdens. The burden of proof, in effect, tells the trier
of fact who must lose on a factual issue if the evidence does not create
the requisite degree of belief in his mind concerning that issue. The
burden of producing evidence, in effect, tells the judge when a party
24 The Evidence Code has abandoned the misleading formula in section 1981 of
the Code of Civil Procedure for determining who has the burden of proof: that the
burden of proof lies with the party who has the affirmative of the issue. What is the
affirmative of an issue depends on how the proposition is formulated. Lack of considera-
tion in a suit on a note and want of probable cause in a malicious prosecution case
are but two examples of negative facts that a party, in these cases the defendant, must
affirmatively prove.
2 5 CAL. EVrDENCE CODE § 405, comment.
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must lose on a factual issue as a matter of law because he has failed
to produce any probative evidence on that issue. To take an example,
the burden of proof says, in effect, that the defendant is entitled to
an instruction that the plaintiff must lose if he fails to persuade the
jury that the defendant was negligent; the burden of producing
evidence says, in effect, that the plaintiff must be nonsuited if he
fails to produce any evidence of the defendant's negligence.
Presumptions
At the outset of a case, the burden of proof as to some facts will be
assigned by the substantive law to one party, the burden of proof as
to other facts will be assigned to the adverse party. Each party will
concomitantly have the initial burden of producing evidence of each
fact as to which he has the burden of proof. As the case progresses,
certain facts may be admitted or otherwise established as a matter
of law, or sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of such facts may
be introduced. At that point the burden of proof or the burden of
producing evidence may be reallocated by a rule of law called a
presumption. For example, in an ordinary paternity case, the child
claiming support will begin the case with the burden of proving
that the defendant is his father. If, however, the child proves that
his mother was married to the defendant at the time of conception
the presumption of legitimacy contained in section 661 becomes ap-
plicable and establishes the necessary precondition of the defendant's
paternity. The defendant will then have the burden of proving that he
is not the plaintiff's father.
Section 600 of the Evidence Code defines a presumption as an
assumption of fact that the law requires to be made when certain
other facts are found or otherwise established. Code of Civil Procedure
section 1959 defined a presumption as a "deduction... to be made
from particular facts." But this is a misnomer, for the conclusion is
one reached as a result of the law's compulsion, not as the result of
an exercise of reason. Indeed, the conclusion may be directly contrary
to reason, as in the recent case of Wareham v. Wareham,26 where the
conclusive presumption of legitimacy was applied despite blood test
evidence which showed that the husband could not have been the
father. The use of the word "assumption" in the Evidence Code defini-
tion, therefore, represents a clarification of rather than a change from
the old law.
Under the Evidence Code, as under the old law, a few presumptions
26 195 Cal. App. 2d 64, 15 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1961).
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are conclusive27 (and thus are not really presumptions at all, but
rather rules of substantive law). All other presumptions are rebuttable.
At this point, the Evidence Code makes what may appear to be
an innovation, for it provides in section 601 that a rebuttable presump-
tion may be either a presumption affecting the burden of proof or a
presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence. Thus, the
Evidence Code does not take either one side or the other of a debate
which has long raged among students of the law of evidence. Some
authorities have asserted that a presumption always shifts the burden
of proof (the so-called Morgan view).28 Others have contended just
as vigorously that a presumption never does more than shift the burden
of introducing evidence, or "going forward" (the Thayer view) .29
Under the Thayer view, a presumption disappears from the case
entirely once the person against whom it operates has introduced
sufficient evidence to support a finding against the presumption, with-
out regard to whether that evidence will be believed by the trier
of fact. The Morgan view is that the presumption is not wholly dispelled
by the introduction of such evidence but continues to have the opera-
tive effect of requiring the judge to instruct the jury to find in accor-
dance with the presumption, unless it is persuaded that the opposite
is true.
The Evidence Code takes the position, in effect, that the Thayer
view is correct as to some presumptions, which the Evidence Code
defines in section 603 as presumptions affecting the burden of produc-
ing evidence, and that the Morgan view is correct as to other presump-
tions, which the Evidence Code defines in section 605 as presumptions
affecting the burden of proof. Certain rebuttable presumptions are
clearly classified by the Code, 0 and standards are provided in sections
603 and 605 for the classification of others by the courts.
Section 605 provides that a presumption established "to implement
some public policy other than [merely] to facilitate the determination
of the particular action in which the presumption is applied. .." is a
presumption affecting the burden of proof. Section 603 provides that a
presumption "established to implement no public policy other than to
facilitate the determination of the particular action in which the pre-
sumption is applied" is a presumption affecting the burden of produc-
27 CAL. EViDENCE CODE §§ 620-24.
28 MCCORMCE , EVMENCE § 317, at 671-72 (1954); MORGA , SoME PROBLEMS OF
Pnoor 81 (1956).29THypm, PRELmqiny TRAT.sE ON EvnmEcE 313-52 (1898); 9 WIGMOBE,
EvmENcE §§ 2485-91 (3d ed. 1940).
30 CAL. EvmENcE CODE §§ 620-68.
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ing evidence. Under this rationale, for example, the presumption of
legitimacy would be classified as one affecting the burden of proof
because its purpose is, in part, to stabilize family relationships. On the
other hand, a presumption relating to the authenticity of official docu-
ments would be classified as one affecting the burden of producing
evidence because its function is only to dispense with formal proof of
matters in those cases in which there is not a bona fide dispute about
them.
Sections 604, 606, and 607 set forth in some detail how each kind of
presumption operates. Under section 604, a presumption affecting the
burden of producing evidence requires that the presumed fact be as-
sumed only until evidence which would support a finding of its non-
existence is produced. Upon the introduction of such evidence, the
presumption ceases to operate entirely, and the trier of fact decides
the factual dispute entirely on the basis of the evidence and without
regard to the presumption-all in accordance with the "Thayer view."
Under sections 606 and 607, however, a presumption affecting the
burden of proof requires the trier of fact to assume the existence of the
presumed fact until he is persuaded, to the requisite degree of per-
suasion, that the fact does not exist, thus codifying the "Morgan view."
Sections 620-68 classify several specific presumptions as (1) con-
clusive presumptions, (2) presumptions affecting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence, or (3) presumptions affecting the burden of proof.
The presumptions thus classified either appeared as statutory presump-
tions in the Code of Civil Procedure or were common law presumptions
closely associated with them. There are, of course, many other statutory
and common law presumptions, and it is to be expected that the
Legislature and the courts will create additional presumptions over the
years. The Evidence Code contemplates that all of these presumptions
will be classified by the courts in accordance with the scheme of classifi-
cation set forth in division 5. This procedure may seem to give the
courts a novel assignment. In fact, this is not the case, for the courts
have long been engaged in substantially this process in dealing with
presumptions. The Evidence Code merely brings the process out into
the open.
Division 6-Witnesses
Division 6 deals with ordinary witnesses, expert witnesses, inter-
preters and translators. Most of division 6 is a restatement and codifi-
cation of existing law, either statutory or decisional, and only the most
important changes will be discussed.
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Disqualification of witnesses is treated somewhat differently in the
Evidence Code than it was under prior law. Section 701 provides:
A person is disqualified to be a witness if he is: (a) Incapable of
expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be understood,
either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand
him; or (b) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell
the truth.
Under the prior law, the court determined not only the capacity of a
witness to express himself and to tell the truth, but also his capacity
to perceive and to recollect that which he is offered to relate. As the
comment to section 701 makes clear, in the Evidence Code capacity
to perceive and capacity to recollect are treated as elements relating
to the witness' personal knowledge of the facts. Under section 702
whether a witness does have the requisite personal knowledge is a
question for the jury rather than the judge to decide. Thus, if the pro-
ponent of a witness offers evidence that the witness does have personal
knowledge, which necessarily includes capacity to perceive and recol-
lect, the witness is permitted to testify, whether or not the judge is per-
suaded that he does have such capacity, unless the judge decides that
the evidence of personal knowledge is so weak that no jury could
reasonably believe it. In effect, the Evidence Code, by treating a
person's capacity to perceive and capacity to recollect as factors rele-
vant to his personal knowledge, has made these factors a condition of
the admissibility of his testimony concerning a particular matter instead
of a condition of his competency to be a witness.
Sections 703 and 704 make some changes in the law relating to
calling the trial judge or a juror as a witness. But this problem arises
so infrequently that it does not warrant discussion here, other than to
note the fact of change.
Section 720, dealing with expert witnesses, may change the law in
one respect. It provides, inter alia, that
Against the objection of a party [the] . .. special knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education [which an expert witness is re-
quired to have] must be shown before the witness may testify as an
expert.
n other words, if a party objects, the expert witness is not permitted
to give his testimony until the necessary foundation to establish his
qualifications is laid, even though the testimony is offered subject to a
motion to strike if the foundation is not later supplied.
Another provision in division 6 relating to expert witnesses which
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may be new is subsection (b) of section 721, which deals with the
cross-examination of expert witnesses. It provides:
If a witness testifying as an expert testifies in the form of an opinion,
he may not be cross-examined in regard to the content or tenor of
any scientific, technical, or professional text, treatise, journal, or
similar publication unless: (1) The witness referred to, considered,
or relied upon such publication in arriving at or forming his opinion;
or (2) Such publication has been admitted in evidence.
The California decisions have been rather confused on the extent to
which an expert witness may be cross-examined by reference to books
and other publications.31 Section 721 (b) permits the cross-examiner to
ask the expert about any publication which he referred to, considered,
or relied upon in arriving at his opinion, in order to probe the thought
processes in which he engaged before taking the stand. It does not
permit reference to other publications, unless they have already been
introduced in evidence, because of concern that the real purpose of the
cross-examiner may be to "bootleg" such hearsay material before the
trier of fact, under the guise of cross-examination. If such publications
have been previously introduced in evidence, cross-examination re-
lating to them is permitted, because the trier of fact will have access
to them anyway.
Subsection (b) of section 722 is also new, in part. It provides:
The compensation and expenses paid or to be paid to an expert
witness by the party calling him is a proper subject of inquiry by
any adverse party as relevant to the credibility of the witness and the
weight of his testimony.
This has been the rule in condemnation cases,82 but it has not hereto-
fore been explicitly applied to other kinds of experts.
There are two fairly substantial changes in the Evidence Code with
respect to the use of writings in connection with testimony by, and
examination of, witnesses. The first deals with refreshing memory by
use of a writing:
[I]f a witness, either while testifying or prior thereto, uses a writing
to refresh his memory with respect to any matter about which he
testifies, such writing must be produced at the hearing at the re-
quest of an adverse party and, unless the writing is so produced,
the testimony of the witness concerning such matter shall be
stricken .... 8 3
31 Compare Baily v. Kreutzmann, 141 Cal. 519, 75 Pac. 104 (1904), with Gluck-
stein v. Lipsett, 93 Cal. App. 2d 391, 209 P.2d 98 (1949); People v. Hooper, 10 Cal.
App. 2d 332, 51 P.2d 1131 (1935).
32 CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1256.2.
83 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 771. (Emphasis added.)
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Prior law on this matter was not entirely clear. While it was established
that a writing used by the witness while he is actually testifying must
be produced,34 it was not clear whether writings used to refresh memory
before the witness takes the stand had to be produced, particularly in
civil cases. 5 The Evidence Code theory is that the time when the
witness used a writing to refresh his memory should be immaterial. It
should be noted, however, that this requirement that the writing be
produced does not apply if the writing is not procurable by the party
offering the witness.36
The other basic change is that under the Evidence Code it is never
necessary to show a witness a writing before he is examined with refer-
ence to it. Although the practice may have been otherwise in some parts
of the state, this is a restatement of pre-existing law except as to prior
inconsistent written statements. A witness previously had to be shown
a prior written inconsistent statement before he was examined con-
cerning it,37 although there was no similar requirement of disclosure
as to a prior oral inconsistent statement.38 Under Evidence Code section
769 neither written nor oral statements, consistent or inconsistent,
have to be disclosed to a witness before he may be examined concern-
ing them. The theory of section 769 is that prior disclosure should not
be required because it eliminates or substantially reduces the element
of surprise which is often an effective device for getting at the truth
in the course of a trial. This change in the law does not, however,
affect the requirement that where a writing is shown to a witness, all
parties to the action must be given an opportunity to inspect the writing
before the witness may be questioned about it.3 9 That requirement is
codified in section 768 (b) of the Evidence Code.
Section 770 adds two new qualifications to the rule that extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement must be excluded, unless the
witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny it.40 Under section
770, it will no longer be necessary to give the witness an opportunity
to explain or deny the statement before it is admitted, if the witness
has not been excused and can be called back to the stand after the
statement is introduced. Moreover, the judge may dispense with the
34 CAL. CODE Crv. Pnoc. § 2047, People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29
(1953).
3 5 Wrra, CALwoFowrA EVxDENCE § 602 (1st ed. SurP. 1963).
36 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 771.
3 7 CAL. CODE CxV. PRoc. § 2052.
38 See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 2032.
39 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 2054.
40 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 2052.
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witness's opportunity to explain or deny if the interests of justice so
require, as, for example, when the inconsistent statement first comes to
light after the witness has been excused.
The right to call and examine adverse witnesses which is provided
in section 776 may depart from the prior law in two minor respects.
First, under the Code the witness is identified with a party, and thus
may be examined as an adverse witness, whether or not his relationship
to the party exists at the time of the trial, so long as it did when the
dispute in the suit arose or when the witness obtained knowledge of the
dispute. As there is no California case which has considered this posi-
tion, the Code seems to have broadened somewhat the definition of
persons who may be examined as adverse witnesses. Second, sub-
division (b), which deals with the cross-examination of witnesses
who are called under section 776, provides in effect that those parties
to the action as to whom the witness is not adverse in interest may only
examine him as if on redirect examination-that is, may not use leading
questions. Thus, for example, if the defendant's employee is called by
the plaintiff under section 776, the defendant, while permitted to
examine the witness following the plaintiff's examination of him, is
not permitted to use leading questions in doing so.41
There are a few changes in chapter 6 of division 6, entitled "Credi-
bility of Witnesses." Section 780 lays down the Code's basic principle
on this matter in these terms:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court or jury may con-
sider in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his
testimony at the hearing, including but not limited to any of the
following ....
Section 780 then lists some eleven matters which, among others, may be
considered in determining the credibility of a witness. What is note-
worthy here is that chapter 6 does not follow the rule that evidence
relating to credibility is collateral as a matter of law, and hence inad-
missible, unless it is independently relevant to the issue being tried."
Instead, the Evidence Code leaves the matter to the trial judge's discre-
tion under section 352, already discussed, which gives him a general
power to exclude evidence when its probative value is outweighed by
such considerations as undue delay, prejudice, or tendency to confuse
the jury.
Section 785 makes another change in the law relating to attacks
41 This limitation is subject to the discretion given the trial judge by § 767 to
permit the use of leading questions, when they would not ordinarily be authorized,
"under special circumstances where the interests of justice... [so] require ......
42 People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 340, 202 P.2d 53, 59 (1949).
[Vol. 18
/
November, 1966] CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE 105
upon the credibility of witnesses in that it permits a party to attack
the credibility of his own witness, without showing surprise and
damage.
Section 788 of the Evidence Code, which deals with the impeach-
ment of a witness by showing his prior conviction of a felony, creates
two new exceptions to the rule, neither of great significance. These
exceptions provide that a prior felony conviction may not be shown if:
(a) A pardon based on his innocence has been granted to the wit-
ness by the jurisdiction in which he was convicted.... (d) The con-
viction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the witness
has been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising from the
conviction pursuant to a procedure substantially equivalent to
[certain California procedures] ... referred to in subdivision (b)
or (c).
The Law Revision Commission originally recommended substantially
greater limitations on the use of felony convictions for impeachment"
but was unable to persuade the Legislature of their desirability over
the concerted opposition of the Attorney General and other law en-
forcement officers and agencies.
Section 791, which deals with the admissibility of prior consistent
statements of trial witnesses, may also make a change in the law. Sub-
section (b) of section 791 restates the law in authorizing the admission
of a prior consistent statement if it is offered after "an express or implied
charge has been made that his [a witness'] testimony at the hearing is
recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive,
and the [prior consistent] statement was made before the bias, motive
for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen."
However, subsection (a) may go beyond the pre-1967 law by making
prior consistent statements admissible if offered after a prior incon-
sistent statement- has been admitted for the purpose of attacking the
credibility of the witness, and the prior consistent statement was made
before the alleged inconsistent statement. If this provision does change
the law, it is no more than a logical extension of the rule that permits
a prior consistent statement to come in to rehabilitate the witness
following an express or implied charge of recent fabrication.
Division 7-Opinion Testimony and
Scientific Evidence
Division 7 of the Evidence Code covers opinion testimony by both
lay and expert witnesses.44 It is substantially a restatement of the
43 7 CAL. L. PEvi Sour ComM'N 715-18 (1964).
44 Division 7 has a separate chapter which codifies the former provisions of the
present law, albeit set forth with greater precision and clarity than in
prior statutes and decisions. The most important change is found in
section 804 (a):
If a witness testifying as an expert testifies that his opinion is based
in whole or in part upon the opinion or statement of another person,
such other person may be called and examined by any adverse party
as if under cross-examination concerning the opinion or statement.
This provision is desirable because an expert witness is permitted by
section 801 (b) to rely, in forming his opinion, upon matter
perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to
him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a
type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates ....
The language permits the expert in some situations to rely upon hearsay
information furnished and opinions rendered by other persons. Where
an expert does rely upon such matter the adverse party will probably
not be able to cross-examine the expert effectively about it. In the
absence of section 804 the adverse party would have no other recourse
than to call as his own witness the person upon whom the expert relied,
with the limitations upon scope of examination which that would entail.
Section 804 permits the expert's informant to be called in effect, as an
adverse witness. Subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of section 804 spell
out certain desirable limitations on this new rule.
Division 8-Privileges
Division 8 deals with the subject of privileges in too much detail
to be recounted or even summarized in this brief survey. A few general
comments may, however, convey some general sense of how the
Evidence Code deals with this complex, not to say controversial, sub-
ject.
First, as has been noted earlier,4' division 8 is unique among the
several divisions of the Evidence Code in that it applies to all proceed-
ings in which testimony may be compelled, including court, legislative,
administrative, arbitration and other proceedings.
Second, division 8 preserves all of the previously existing privileges,
Code of Civil Procedure on the use of blood tests to determine paternity and it has a
separate article on Value, Damages and Benefit in Eminent Domain and Inverse Con-
demnation Cases. (For a detailed analysis of this article, which appears as part of this
symposium on the law of evidence, see Carlson, Statutory Rules of Evidence in Eminent
Domain Proceedings, 18 I-AsTirNs L.J. 143 (1966)-Editor.)
45 See text at note 6 supra.
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creates at least one new privilege, and may create another. The priv-
ilege that is clearly new is the "psychotherapist-patient privilege"
which is applicable, as provided in section 1011, when a person consults
or is examined by a certified psychologist or by a doctor who devotes a
substantial portion of his time to psychotherapy "for the purpose of
securing a diagnosis or preventive, palliative or curative treatment of
his mental or emotional condition .... ." Another privilege which may
be new40 is the trade secret privilege created by section 1060:
If he or his agent or employee claims the privilege, the owner of a
trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to
prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege
will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.
Third, while the pre-Code privileges are preserved, a number of
them are changed in detail. The most significant changes were made
in the marital testimonial privilege. Under sections 1881(1) of the
Code of Civil Procedure and 1322 of the Penal Code (both super-
seded by the Evidence Code), a married person had a privilege, sub-
ject to certain exceptions, to prevent his spouse from testifying either
for or against him in a civil or criminal action to which he was a party.
Section 1322 of the Penal Code also gives a married person a privilege
not to testify for or against his spouse in a criminal action to which
the spouse was a party.
The privilege of a married person not to call his spouse to testify
for him is not continued in the Evidence Code. If a case can be
imagined in which a party would wish to avail himself of this privilege,
he could achieve the same result by simply not asking his spouse to
take the stand. Nor does the Evidence Code continue the privilege of
a non-party spouse to refuse to testify in favor of the party spouse in a
criminal action. It is difficult to imagine a case in which this privilege
would be claimed for other than mercenary or spiteful motives, and it
prevents access to evidence which might save an innocent person from
conviction.
The Evidence Code does continue the privilege not to have one
spouse testify against the other, but it makes an important change
concerning who may claim the privilege. Prior to the Code either
spouse could claim the privilege not to have one spouse testify against
the other in a criminal action, and the party spouse could claim the
privilege not to have his spouse testify against him in a civil action.
4 There is no California case holding that there is a privilege to refuse disclosure
of a trade secret. However, the court in Wilson v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 275,
225 Pac. 881 (1924), recognized that the privilege may exist.
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The Evidence Code gives the "against" privilege exclusively to the
witness spouse on the rationale that its purpose is to preserve domestic
tranquility, and the witness spouse is likelier than the party spouse to
determine objectively whether to claim the privilege on that basis.
Fourth, one of the major contributions of the new Evidence Code
is that, subject to two important exceptions, the Code deals with each
privilege in considerable detail. It also treats similar problems relating
to several privileges in a uniform manner. The prior law was not only
unclear on many matters of detail with respect to many privileges
but, where it was clear, it often treated the same questions quite dif-
ferently in respect of different privileges. At the very least, the new
Evidence Code will provide judges and lawyers with a body of de-
tailed and internally consistent rules on the subject; hopefully, the
rules also embody sensible answers to the questions with which they
deal.
However, there are major exceptions to the detailed treatment of
privileges where the Code deals .with the privilege of a defendant in
a criminal case not to be called as a witness 47 and the privilege against
self-incrimination.4" In each instance the Evidence Code simply de-
clares that the privilege exists "to the extent that such privilege exists
under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California."
Because of the fluidity of* our developing constitutional law in these
areas, the Law Revision Commission concluded it would be unwise
either to attempt to codify the existing law or to anticipate future
developments. This treatment of the subject leaves to the courts the
responsibility not only for determining the scope of the respective
privileges, but also for developing the rules respecting waiver of these
privileges and exceptions to them.
Fifth, section 913 provides, in effect, that no comment may be
made by court or counsel concerning a claim of privilege, and that no
inference may be drawn from the making of such a claim by the trier
of fact on any issue, whether the privilege is exercised in the instant
proceeding or was exercised on a prior occasion. Where the privilege
against self-incrimination is claimed by one other than a defendant in
a criminal case, section 913 would appear to be broader than the prior
law.49
47 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 930.
4 8 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 940.
49 This statement depends on whether and to what extent Nelson v. Southern
Pac. Ry., 8 Cal. 2d 648, 654-55, 67 P.2d 682, 685 (1937), may be considered as
having been substantially overruled by such cases as People v. Snyder, 50 Cal. 2d 190,
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Sixth, section 915 establishes a new procedure with respect to pass-
ing on some claims of privilege. Subsection (a) of this section precludes
the judge from requiring disclosure of information in order to deter-
mine whether it is privileged, thus restating prior law.50 Subsection (b)
creates an exception to this rule, however, in the case of three priv-
ileges: official information, identity of informer, 51 and trade secret. The
reason for these exceptions is that all three privileges are qualified
privileges, in that they apply only where the necessity for preserving
confidentiality outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest
of justice. It seems not unlikely that cases will arise in which these
competing considerations cannot be intelligently weighed and bal-
anced by the trial judge unless he knows the substance of the informa-
tion claimed to be privileged. Subsection (b) authorizes the judge to
require such disclosure, while attempting to safeguard the information
if it is then determined to be privileged, by prohibiting its later dis-
closure by those who were present in the judge's chambers when it
was divulged.
Another important new provision is section 91652 which puts the
burden on the trial judge or other presiding officer to protect privileged
information where it ought not to be disclosed and where neither the
witness nor a party to the proceeding is entitled to claim the privilege.
197, 324 P.2d 1, 6 (1958). In Nelson it was held proper to admit evidence of a prior
claim of privilege against self-incrimination for purposes of impeachment. However, in
Snyder the court held that it was error to admit such evidence to show consciousness
of guilt. See People v. Sharer, 61 Cal. 2d 869, 40 Cal. Rptr. 857, 395 P.2d 899 (1964).
50 See Collette v. Sarrasin, 184 Cal. 283, 288-89, 193 Pac. 571, 573 (1920).
51 In the case of the privilege not to disclose the identity of an informer, it should
be noted that in Martin v. Superior Court, 242 A.C.A. 573, 51 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1966),
the District Court of Appeal held that CAL. CODE Civ. Puoc. § 1881.1 (now CAL.
EvmENcE CODE § 1042) was unconstitutional. The discretion vested in a magistrate as
to whether disclosure of the identity of the informant must be required deprives the
defendant of his constitutional right to due process of law where the testimony of the
unidentified informant is necessary to establish probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant.
52 CAL. EVMENCE CODE § 916 provides: "(a) The presiding officer, on his own
motion or on the motion of any party, shall exclude information that is subject to a
claim of privilege under this division if:
(1) The person from whom the information is sought is not a person authorized to
claim the privilege; and
(2) There is no party to the proceeding who is a person authorized to claim the
privilege.
(b) The presiding officer may not exclude information under this section if:
(1) He is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure; or
(2) The proponent of the evidence establishes that there is no person authorized to
claim the privilege in existence.
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Division 9-Evidence Affected or Excluded
by Extrinsic Policies
Chapter 1 of this Division deals with the admissibility of evidence
relating to character, habit, or custom. Most of its provisions probably
restate the prior law, albeit with considerable clarification as to what
evidence is admissible in what circumstances with respect to what
issues. There are three principal innovations in chapter 1.
Section 1100 makes it clear that where a person's character or trait
of character is an ultimate fact in dispute, it may be proved by opinion,
reputation, or specific instances of conduct.
In the relatively few instances in which evidence of character is
admissible in a criminal action to prove the conduct of the defendant,
such character may ,be proved not only by evidence of reputation,
as formerly,53 but also by opinion evidence.
Section 1105, which deals with evidence of habit or custom to
prove conduct, makes such evidence admissible whether or not there
are any eyewitnesses to the alleged conduct-clearly a departure from
prior law. 4
Chapter 2 of division 9 deals with a variety of situations in which
what is or may be relevant evidence is excluded because of some over-
riding extrinsic policy, for example, the inadmissibility of evidence of
liability insurance 55 and of offers to compromise.r6 Here, again, the
Evidence Code simply restates familiar and well-established law. The
rules which, in conformity with existing law, exclude evidence of offers
to compromise 57 and offers to discount a claim5" are broadened beyond
their previous scope to exclude evidence of any conduct or statements
made in the course of negotiating toward or about such offers. This
extension is made on the theory that the underlying policy of en-
couraging people to settle their differences out of court extends as
logically to such negotiations as to the offers themselves.
Division 10-Hearsay Evidence
The first chapter of division 10 contains the hearsay rule itself and
a few provisions of general application to hearsay evidence. Section
1200 defines hearsay evidence in traditional terms: "evidence of a
53 People v. Cobb, 45 Cal. 2d 158, 287 P.2d 752 (1955); People v. Fair, 43 Cal.
137 (1872); See Wrr=, CAMnuou.c EvIDEN CE §§ 329-30 (2d ed. 1966).
54 See Boone v. Bank of America, 220 Cal. 93, 29 P.2d 409 (1934).
5 5 CAL. EvDENCE CODE § 1155.
56 CAL. EvDENcE CODE § 1152.
57 Ibid.
58 CAL. EVmIENCE CODE § 1154.
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statement made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing
that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." If an extra-
judicial statement is offered to prove some fact other than the truth
of the matter stated, it is not hearsay evidence and is, therefore, not sub-
ject to the hearsay rule, although it may be excludable on other
grounds.
"Statement" as used in the hearsay rule is defined in section 225
to include only "verbal expression" or "nonverbal conduct.., intended
... as a substitute for.., verbal expression." Thus, hearsay as defined
in the Evidence Code does not include-and the hearsay rule does not,
therefore, exclude-evidence of nonverbal, nonassertive conduct that
is offered to prove a person's belief as a basis for an inference that
the fact believed is true-e.g., proof of flight as evidence of a sense
of guilt as evidence, in turn, that the actor comitted a crime. There
has been some confusion in the California cases as to whether such
evidence is subject to the hearsay rule.59 Under the Evidence Code
it is not.
Section 1202 makes a minor change in the law, by providing that
any hearsay declarant can be impeached by an inconsistent statement,
whether or not he has been given an opportunity to explain or deny the
inconsistency.
Section 1203(a) introduces an innovation to California law. It
permits a party against whom a hearsay statement has been introduced
to call the hearsay declarant as a witness and cross-examine him. Thus,
when the hearsay declarant is available as a witness the adverse party
is put on substantially the same footing in respect of the hearsay de-
clarant as he is vis-a-vis an adverse witness at the trial.60
Chapter 2 of Division 10 sets forth, in 14 articles, more than 40
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Most of these exceptions were recognized
in the law prior to the Code. There are, however, some new exceptions,
and some existing exceptions are substantially revised. The limitations
of this article will not permit discussion of all of the exceptions, nor
even mention of all of the minor changes. Provisions that are likely to
have a significant impact on the California law are discussed briefly.
New Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
Perhaps the most significant of the new exceptions is section 1235
which provides that a prior inconsistent statement of a trial witness
GO Compare Estate of DeLaveaga, 165 Cal. 607, 133 Pac. 307 (1913), with People
v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 Pac. 65 (1924).
60 CAL. EvDENCE CoDE § 1203(b)-(d) provides desirable limitations on this rule
to prohibit, for example, a party's counsel from examining the party himself with leading
questions following the introduction of his extrajudicial admission.
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is admissible as evidence of the truth of the matter stated. Formerly,
such a statement was admissible for impeachment only, and could not
be considered as substantive evidence.6 1 The significance of this change
in the law is enhanced by section 785, which permits a party to impeach
his own witness without showing that he was surprised and damaged by
the witness' testimony or that the witness is hostile. The effect of the
two sections, taken together, is to enable a party to get to the jury, if
need be, by introducing the prior inconsistent statements of his own
"turncoat" witness.
Section 1227 creates a new hearsay exception in wrongful death
actions, making the statements of the decedent prior to his death ad-
missible against the heirs or representatives. Similarly, section 1226
makes the statements of a minor admissible against his parents when
they sue to recover damages for an injury to him.
The legislation that enacted the Evidence Code repealed the
so-called "dead-man statute,"62 which prohibited a person suing on a
claim against a decedents estate from testifying about anything that
happened prior to the decedents death. To balance the advantage
given the claimant by repealing this provision, Evidence Code section
1261 creates a new exception to the hearsay rule that permits the estate
to introduce on its own behalf in such cases relevant hearsay statements
of the decedent.
Another new hearsay exception that may be of some significance is
found in section 1300 which provides that a felony conviction is ad-
missible in a civil action to prove any fact essential to the conviction.
The person convicted need not be a party to the subsequent civil
litigation. The section will, in effect, overrule such cases as Burke v.
Wells, Fargo & Co.,63 wherein Wells Fargo successfully asserted that
it did not have to pay a reward for the apprehension of a stage robber
on the ground that the criminal conviction of the robber was not
competent evidence that he had robbed the stage.
Section 1284 provides a new hearsay exception that may prove use-
ful at times. Code of Civil Procedure section 1893 has been amended
to require custodians of public records to issue certificates stating that
a specified record cannot, after diligent search, be found. Section 1284
makes such certificates admissible to prove the absence of the specified
record from the custodian's files. Such certificates may thus be used as
evidence that particular events, which would normally have been
recorded in various public records if they had occurred, did not occur.
61Albert v. McKay & Co., 174 Cal. 451, 456, 163 Pac. 666, 668 (1917).
62CAL. CODE CIV. P1oc. § 1880(3).
03 34 Cal. 60 (1867).
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Substantially Revised Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
Perhaps the most significant revision of an exception to the hearsay
rule relates to the former testimony exception. The prior law made
testimony given at a previous trial admissible only if the previous action
was one between the same parties and related to the same subject
matter as that involved in the subsequent trial in which the evidence
is offered. 4 Section 1291 of the Evidence Code permits former testi-
mony to be introduced against a party if (1) he introduced the testi-
mony himself at the previous trial or (2) he had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness at the former trial with an interest and motive
similar to that which he has in the proceeding in which the former
testimony is offered. Section 1292, which is limited to civil actions, goes
a step further. It makes former testimony admissible against a party,
even though he himself had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, if a party to the former action did have the opportunity to do
so and had, at that time, an interest and motive similar to that which
the objecting party has in the proceeding in which the former testi-
mony is offered. These provisions tend to minimize the consequences
of the loss of a witness when several cases arise out of one event.
The hearsay exception for dying declarations relating to the cause
and circumstances of the declarant's death has also been broadened.
Under section 1242, such declarations are admissible in all civil and
criminal actions, not just criminal homicide actions as provided by
prior law.65
Section 1237 makes it somewhat easier to prove recorded recollec-
tion for it does not require, as did prior law,6 that the record have
been made by the witness himself or under his direction, so long as
there is proof that the witness' memory was accurately recorded.
Section 1251 broadens slightly the hearsay exception for statements
of feeling, pain, or bodily health. Under prior law, statements of past
symptoms of this sort were inadmissible67 although statements of
existing pain or feeling were admissible.6 8 Section 1251 makes the
statements of past symptoms, whether made to a physician or to any
other person, admissible if the declarant is not available to testify
personally and he had no obvious motive to mislead anyone at the
time when the statement was made.
6 4 CAL. CODE CIV. Pioc. § 1870(8).
65 CAL. CODE Cxv. Pnoc. § 1870(4).
66 CAL. CODE Cxv. !hoc. § 2047.
67 People v. Brown, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 586, 320 P.2d 5, 10 (1958).
68 Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 Pac. 251 (1920).
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Section 1224 may have considerable impact. It provides, in sub-
stance, that in any action where the liability of the defendant depends
on the liability of another person, any statement of that other person
that would have been admissible against him to prove his liability is
admissible against the defendant. Section 1224 actually makes no major
change in the law, for section 1851 of the Code of Civil Procedure
states essentially the same rule. But while section 1851 has been ap-
plied in actions against a surety69 and in actions against a vehicle owner
for the negligent driving of a person entrusted with the vehicle,70
it has not, for some inexplicable reason, been applied in actions against
employers for torts committed by their employees. Section 1224 makes
it quite clear that the admission of the employee is admissible against
the employer when the latter's liability is based on respondeat superior.
These, then, are the most significant revisions the Evidence Code
makes in the law relating to hearsay. The remainder of the division,
although it does not make major changes in the law, is nonetheless a
significant contribution. Virtually all of the general exceptions to the
hearsay rule are gathered into this division, organized for efficient use,
and clearly stated. Thus, the hearsay rule and its principal exceptions
will be readily available to both judges and lawyers who, perforce,
must often read as they run.
Division 11-Writings
There is very little new law in any of the chapters on writings in
division 11. Chapter 1, however, in dealing with authentication and
proof of writings, provides a quite explicit and helpful analysis of
the separate steps involved in this aspect of getting documents into
evidence. The only new law encountered in chapter 1 is found in
sections 1452, 1453, and 1454, which create rebuttable presumptions
that certain official seals and signatures are genuine and authorized,
thus effecting a desirable simplification of the law on this subject.
Article I of chapter 2, on Secondary Evidence of Writings, restates
the best evidence rule, codifies a number of established exceptions
thereto, and creates a few new or modified exceptions.
Article 2 of chapter 2 of division 11 is entitled "Official Writings and
Recorded Writings." Section 1530, which is new, establishes consider-
ably simplified methods of proving the content of writings in the
custody of public entities, whether in the United States or in a foreign
69 Standard Oil Co. v. Houser, 101 Cal. App. 2d 480, 225 P.2d 539 (1950).
70 Ingram v. Bob Jaffe Co., 139 Cal. App. 2d 193, 293 P.2d 132 (1956).
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country. The effect of the statute is to make purported copies of official
writings prima facie self-authenticating by creating rebuttable pre-
sumptions of their authenticity. Thus, where there is no actual dispute
between the parties as to their genuineness, the documents are auto-
matically authenticated. Where there is a dispute, on the other hand,
and the opponent is prepared to back up his challenge by introducing
some evidence of the non-authenticity of such documents, the trier
of fact must decide that issue from the available evidence, the burden
of proof being on the proponent of the evidence.
Section 1532 makes an official record of a writing prima facie
evidence of the authenticity of the original. This is the present rule with
respect to writings affecting real property;72 the Evidence Code extends
the rule to all recorded writings.
Article 3 of chapter 2 of division 11 deals with business-record
photographic copies of writings; article 4 deals with proof of hospital
records; and chapter 3 deals with official writings affecting property.
For the most part, they restate previously existing law, as found in
various sections of the Code of Civil Procedure and judicial decisions
interpreting and supplementing them.
Conclusion
Hopefully, this preliminary "Cooks' Tour" of the Evidence Code
has provided some idea of the general organization and format of the
Code and of the balance it strikes between restatement and revision
of the California law of evidence. Even more hopefully, it has brought
the reader to the view, at least tentatively, that this new handbook of
the California law of evidence will be a useful tool for California judges
and lawyers in their day-to-day work-whatever doubts or reservations
he may entertain about particular innovations.
71 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1500.
72 CAL. CODE CIv. ProC. § 1951.
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